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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the poor ongoing economic outlook, particularly for emerging market countries such 
as South Africa, new innovative, low-risk opportunities for improved service delivery and 
societal outcomes are particularly attractive. This is critically true for Early Childhood 
Development interventions given their ability to positively impact the school-readiness of 
learners and thus improve education outcomes.  
 
This exploratory investigation examined relevant Social Impact Bonds from other markets 
and concluded that their implementation is likely to find traction within an emerging market 
context such as South Africa. The findings suggest that short to medium term (less than 5 
years) SIB contractual periods are preferred with investor capital fully risk exposed. 
 
Key words: Social Impact Bonds, Impact Investing, Pay for Success, Pay by Results, 
Development Impact Bond, Early Childhood Development, South Africa, education 
outcomes  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As an introduction, this chapter will provide some background to this research endeavour and 
seek to provide a context in which the review will occur.  
1.1 Overview 
 
Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), being a relatively new financial instrument, suffer from high 
degrees of information asymmetry. Furthermore, each SIB is uniquely tailored for the 
specific role-players and required social outcomes being funded. Transaction costs are thus 
high, no secondary market exists for the asset and consequently there is only a small pool of 
primary investors willing to shoulder the risk. 
Taking its cue from the South African Governments National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 
(National Planning Commission, 2012), the Western Cape Government’s Provincial Strategic 
Plan 2014-2019 has identified improved education outcomes as one of its strategic goals 
(Western Cape Government, 2014). 
Using a review of the evolution of Impact Investing, government privatisation of social 
spending and the lessons from existing SIBs, this study seeks to inform the implementation of 
a SIB in an emerging market context, more specifically within the education environment of 
early childhood development (ECD) in the Western Cape Government. 
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1.2 Research Context and Justification 
 
Governments, with ever-constrained resources, faced complex social problems for which they 
are ill equipped. The Western Cape Government for example highlights the need to improve 
the quality of education in poorer communities, but within budget limitations  (Western Cape 
Government, 2014). 
In addition to requiring new sources of capital, innovative specialised and effective service 
provision is also required to address a complex social issue such as improving education 
outcomes. These factors have created an environment calling for a new form of financing and 
risk sharing to solve certain social problems. SIBs represent a new paradigm of investing that 
seeks to marry private sector capital to societal needs on the bedrock of risk adjusted returns 
and reduced information asymmetry. The following graph is a representation of the 
cumulative growth of the SIBs and reflects SIB backed projects that have been launched 
since inception in 2010 through to February 2016. 
 
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the number of currently active global SIBs. 
Source: (Finance for the Good, 2016) 
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The research investigates whether a SIB is an appropriate financing tool or method that can 
improve certain educational outcomes in the Western Cape context. In 2013 the Centre for 
Development and Enterprise, noting declining standards, called for innovation in the delivery 
of schooling through a shift towards publicly funded privately managed schools (John, 2013). 
A 2010 World Bank report on financing higher education in Africa highlights the constraints 
on maintaining or growing higher education provision in African countries with narrow tax 
bases. It goes on to suggest the need for alternate financing methods to ensure improvements 
in education provision (World Bank, 2010). South Africa’s already over-burdened and 
narrow tax base represents a major constraint to expanding government spending (Visser, 
2014). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), who cite 
South Africa’s narrow tax base as being unable to meet the countries future spending 
requirements, supports this view (Vollgraaff, 2015). South Africa’s own former Finance 
Minister, Nhlanla Nene, recently highlighted the need to broaden South Africa’ tax base to 
enable the state to expand its investment into education and further nation-building 
endeavours (Nene, 2015) 
There are currently 13 SIB’s focussed on education. The bulk of these relate to vocational 
education with outcome metrics focussed on increased employment. (Bloomgarden, Eddy, & 
Levey, 2014). In the USA, Goldman Sachs and JB Pritzker (a venture capitalist) are funding 
two SIBs focussed on access to early childhood education, with the outcome metric here 
being a reduced take up of remedial education programmes (Bloomgarden et al., 2014; 
Gustafsson-Wright & Atinc, 2014). 
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Given SIB’s have only been in operation for five years, little research has been conducted 
into the potential benefits these financial instruments can facilitate. The South African 
Government may have improved access to education, but the quality of education, 
particularly for those from poorer parts, remains problematic (The World Bank, 2011).  
To this end, both The World Bank and John, call for the inclusion of the private sector in 
preserving and improving the quality of education (John, 2013; World Bank, 2010). 
Efficiency gains from private sector involvement are not a guaranteed silver bullet to 
overcome government inefficiency (Megginson & Netter, 2001).  However in situations of 
state-led market failure, or where measurable output based deliverables are in place, private 
sector participation typically does lead to improved efficiencies (Christiansen, 2007; 
Joumard, Lonti, & Curristine, 2007). Correctly incentivised, monitored and measured, 
specialised private sector service providers may thus fare better at service delivery than 
government. 
 
1.3 Research Objective 
 
This study therefore seeks to explore the application of SIB in a developing country 
educational environment to provide both economic value and improved outcomes. In doing 
this, the various stakeholders within a SIB partnership may then have a clearer understanding 
of the economic returns and associated risks with a specific successful outcome being funded. 
It will also seek to understand who should fund such SIB. This in turn can shape the risk- 
return discussions between output funders and investors and other stakeholders. 
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1.4 Research Problem  
 
SIBs potentially provide the investment platform to assist financing transformative solutions 
to complex social problems. However, primary investors, being required to shoulder much of 
the risk, have little robust data upon which to value the impact of their investment. This 
creates a barrier to investment. Assessing the economic / financial value of the social impact 
remains problematic, notably for sponsoring governments and investors seeking appropriate 
risk adjusted returns.  
Thus, based on a review of existing relevant SIBs, what are the primary recommendations to 
consider for developing a SIB for the Western Cape Education sector? 
1.5 Significance of the Research 
 
A 2014 World Economic Forum report, notes a changing investor demographic with current 
and future investor values set to focus on environmental and societal improvements. The shift 
is most apparent in women and the so-called millennial generation who within the next 40 
years are likely to own 70% of all US intergenerational wealth estimated as $ 41 trillion 
(World Economic Forum, 2014).  
Education has long been seen as fundamental to improving social impact through improving 
child well-being whilst reducing poverty and inequality (UNICEF, 2012). More pointedly, 
the strategy of increasing school readiness of learners is seen as being amongst the most 
effective interventions yielding positive social impact (Berry, Biersteker, Dawes, Lake, & 
Smith, 2013; UNICEF, 2012)  
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of the current size and estimated potential size of the broader Impact Investment 
market. 
Source: (Seegull, 2013) 
 
For the projections reflected above the Monitor Institute assumes that only 1% of Assets 
under Management, i.e. controlled by institutional investors / asset managers, would be 
earmarked for Impact Investments. The JP Morgan estimate is based on the assumption that 
5% of Assets under Management is designated for Impact Investing. The potential capital 
available is thus significant even if one assumes the more conservative of estimates (Seegull, 
2013). 
The current state of play, however still sees the control of the majority of investment funds 
vested with institutional investors / asset managers, operating within the confines of their 
fiduciary duties, notably the duties of loyalty and care. We thus see ownership of investment 
funds divorced from control (Hawley & Williams, 2007). In order to access mainstream 
investment capital, investment products, that are understood and accepted by fiduciary 
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managers, need to be brought to market. For SIBs to gain mainstream acceptance, and by 
doing so unlock mainstream investment capital, the benefits (both social and economic) 
arising from the social outcome being funded needs to be understood. 
This study may prove valuable to stakeholders, seeking improved educational outcomes, 
within the South African investment (notably Corporate Social Investment practitioners), 
education and government sectors. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the dissertation 
 
The thesis is divided into four main chapters. Chapter 2 is a detailed content review, and 
deals with the origins and purpose of SIBs whilst also examining the importance of 
improving education outcomes with specific reference to early childhood development in 
South Africa. This section explores impact investing as an investment approach after which 
the evolution of government financing arrangements are discussed to highlight how SIBs may 
be viewed as a further extension of such public-private partnership arrangements.  
Chapter 3 deals with the analysis and discussion as garnered from the review of the existing 
SIBs. Chapter 4 will then provide recommendations for the highlights areas for future 
research that may advance the use of SIBs to improve ECD outcomes in an emerging markets 
context. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews SIBs and the importance for improving education outcomes in early 
childhood development. The chapter also explores the evolution of public private 
partnerships and reflects on how SIBs may be viewed as the next evolutionary step in such 
arrangements. Finally, the chapter reviews and summarise existing ECD SIBs. 
 
2.2 Overview of SIBs 
 
The literature review explores the relatively new SIB phenomenon. It explores the 
background and seeks to highlight the evolution that has given rise to SIBs, notably the 
Impact Investing landscape, certain strategies already employed by government as well key 
challenges facing the instrument.  The history and characteristics of the relevant SIBs already 
in operation will also be compared and contrasted, with the objective of providing a series of 
recommendations that may inform the implementation of a SIB within an emerging market 
context such as South Africa.  
 
2.3 Theory of Social Impact Bonds 
SIBs are a relatively new form of financing arrangement with the first SIB, the Peterborough 
Prison Social Impact Bond,  having been launched in the UK in 2010 (Bryan & Rafferty, 
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2014; Wilson, 2014). The first such bond in the USA was launched by New York City, for 
prisoners on Riker’s Island, in 2012 (OECD, 2013). The concept was however propagated 
with an idea for a social policy bond in the late 1980’s by a New Zealand economist, Ronnie 
Horesch (Clifford & Jung, 2016).  
SIBs may be viewed as a nexus for a number of inter-related areas. Firstly, one could trace its 
roots in Social Innovation, notably to the Connected Difference theory of Social Innovation 
as described by Mulgan in Oxford University’s Said Business School report of 2007. The 
theory espouses three important components to social innovation:  
- They are typically hybrids or new combinations of existing elements, as opposed to 
being completely new themselves 
- Their implementation dissects organisational, sectoral or disciplinary boundaries 
- In connecting together previously disparate role-players, they create powerful and 
lasting new social relationships 
The report goes on to point out a potential link between social development and having a 
critical mass of quality innovative social connectors (Mulgan, Tucker, Ali, & Sanders, 2007). 
Secondly, they can be viewed as a market driven development that seeks to link investors to 
returns. In many ways SIBs may be viewed as the next evolutionary step following 
Outsourcing, Public Private Partnerships (PPP) and Pay by Results (PbR) arrangements. Each 
of these may be viewed as a form of deliberate government action, either to stimulate private 
sector investment in a particular area or, to utilize private market expertise and efficiencies in 
service delivery. The common thread in each of these is the rewards for private sector 
participation or investment.  
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Thirdly, given the social context, SIBs may be seen as a particular focus point within the 
broader Sustainable Responsible Investment (SRI) arena. A 2015 Global Economy and 
Development report from Brookings describe SIBs as a subset of impact investing 
(Gustafsson-Wright, Gardiner, & Putcha, 2015). Here a SIB can be viewed as the financial 
instrument distilled from Impact Investing, within the broader SRI arena. 
It is important to realise that SIBs are not bonds in the traditional sense. In common financial 
parlance, a bond is understood to be a financial instrument of indebtedness, whereby the 
issuer is contractually obliged to repay, at a specified later date, the principal, and typically to 
also pay regular interest or coupon payments. SIB’s, whilst sharing some commonality with 
respect to having a finite date, are more akin to an equity investment. The reason for this is 
that the ‘bond-holders’ (more typically called investors) principal is not guaranteed and no 
regular interest or coupon is paid. Instead, the ‘bond-holders’ principal is at risk and only 
repaid, with interest (or profit), upon the specific social outcomes being achieved. 
The 2011 Young Foundation paper employs the term ‘funding mechanism’ to describe SIB’s. 
They are further seen to offer new sources of financing, in a resource-constrained 
environment, to social outcomes. Three key characteristics that are highlighted are the 
financial investment, a series of actions leading to social improvements and payers 
commitment to reward investors on the basis of the improved social outcome (Mulgan, 
Reeder, Aylott, & Bo’sher, 2011). 
SIBs are also described as a channel through which private capital is entering the publicly 
funded social impact arena. This private capital, whilst requiring a risk adjusted return, is 
supplanting both government funding and risk, whilst driving innovation with respect to 
social interventions (Sulemankhil & Novak, 2012). 
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Social Finance Limited also defines a SIB as both a ‘financial mechanism’ and a ‘contract’ 
and notes key role-players as the government (or more broadly the public sector) and socially 
motivated investors. They further highlight improved social outcomes as being the 
measurable metric that results in the investor being repaid their investment plus a return 
(Social Finance Limited, 2013).  
McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield and Donaldson (2013) recently described SIBs as differing 
from traditional pay-by-results (PbR) arrangements and not sharing any characteristics with 
traditional bonds. Instead, returns accrue only upon certain social outcomes being met. Again, 
this points to being closer to an equity instrument than a bond.  They further characterise 
SIBs with terms such as ‘multi-stakeholder arrangement’ whilst noting key role-players to 
again include investors and government. Service providers and intermediary organisation, 
acting as brokers are also noted.  
According to Pauly and Swanson in 2013, SIBS are characterised by the upfront provision of 
capital by private investors that not only reduces service provider risk, but also bridges the 
gap created by shrinking government budgets. They note further features to include 
innovative performance features and stringent monitoring and evaluation against set targets 
(Pauly & Swanson, 2013). 
Ragin and Palandijan, providing an American view, support the view that SIBs are the next 
evolutionary step for impact investing. SIBs are further seen as providing the nexus around 
which impact investors can achieve financial returns and positive social outcomes (Ragin & 
Palandjian, 2013). The OECD describes SIBs as being a payment by results financing model 
that rewards private investors (OECD, 2013). 
(Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013) in a Said Business School case study of the Peterborough 
Pilot SIB, describes it as an innovative series of contracts for financing welfare and other 
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social services. Key role-players noted include government, service providers and external 
investors, with the arrangement linking back well to public-private partnerships already 
employed in the UK.  
Warner too rejects the link to traditional bonds and asserts they are more akin to Pay for 
Success Bonds. She furthermore introduces philanthropists and venture capitalists into the 
range of stakeholders whilst noting SIBs ability to crowd in both political and financial 
capital that enable risk taking. In comparing SIBs to PPPs she notes that SIBs payments 
follow only successful outcomes, unlike PPP payments typically based on inputs or delivered 
services. A further distinguishing feature introduced is that of a far shorter time horizon, less 
than 10 years, compared to many traditional PPPs whose lifespans typically runs to 20-50 
years (Warner, 2013). 
In a recent South African report, SIBs are noted to be instruments designed to assist 
governments in the endeavours to improve social programmes. Role-players noted in the 
report include specialised service providers, investors, performance managers and 
government, that is typically the outcomes funder (Genesis Anlaytics, 2014). SIBs are 
described as more structured product requiring qualified role-players and are hence not akin 
to traditional bonds.  They also enable upfront funding for projects which allows them to 
demonstrate their value and hence attract further funding (Coble, 2014). Another concurring 
South African view refers to SIBs as being both innovative outcomes based contracts and 
innovative methods of financing social programmes for governments (University of Cape 
Town, Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd, & Social Finance Limited, 2014).  
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The mechanics detailing the various role-players and transactional flows of a typical SIB may 
be viewed in figure 6 below.
. 
Figure 3: The mechanics of a typical SIB. 
Source: (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015) 
 
The common threads running through the literature leads one to define SIBs as an innovative 
funding mechanism, contract or instrument employed to improve social outcomes. 
 
2.3.1 SIBs Origins and Purpose 
 
SIBs are seen as having arisen as a result of financial crises, which led to government 
spending cuts and ultimately the need for a more efficient use of scarce public resources. 
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Governments are currently left struggling to provide funding to social problems where the 
benefits only accrue over a long term horizon (Deprez, 2014). Instead, we see investment in 
short term projects with more immediate impacts that serve to keep the electorate enamoured 
with the current government. This view is somewhat supported by Jung and Clifford who 
conclude that SIB’s unique contribution is that it enables social interventions by overcoming 
governmental constraints through crowding together various stakeholders and financial 
resources (Clifford & Jung, 2016).  
Outsourcing the delivery of social interventions to a combination third party organisations 
and private institutions is seen as a way to ensure greater innovation, efficiency and 
effectiveness of the interventions (McHugh, Sinclair, Roy, Huckfield, & Donaldson, 2013). It 
also provides a mechanism to attract private investment capital to fund improved social 
outcomes (Warner, 2013). 
They are relatively new financial instruments within the social services sphere and their 
underlying composition is akin to standard financing arrangement. Their use is however 
particularly being advocated for financing programmes in the health-care sphere (Pauly & 
Swanson, 2013) and behavioural change programmes (McKinsey & Company, 2012). The 
anticipated benefits accrue when private capital brings with it considerable financial nous and 
accountability to bear in the social sector. This in turn drives result orientated evaluation of 
interventions, aligned to the predefined outcomes (Sulemankhil & Novak, 2012). 
Figure 7 below reflects how savings might be captured through the implementation of a SIB 
to improve a social outcome. With an increase in preventative spending on programmes or 
interventions aimed at improving social outcomes, we see a greater decline in reactive 
spending to remedy social ills. Combined the ‘new’ under a SIB regime, is less than before 
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(the status quo), thus providing savings which can fund investor returns as well as be retained 
by the outcome funder (Boggild & Bronson, 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The economic case for utilizing a social impact bond. 
Source: (Boggild & Bronson, 2015) 
 
A further purpose for SIBs that is introduced is that of being the creation of a marketplace for 
impact investing, which will in turn provide more opportunities to access new capital. This 
can be achieved through investor / asset manager driven due diligence, performance 
management and reporting. The improvements in service provision then ultimately drives the 
returns that can be achieved (Ragin & Palandjian, 2013). This view is supported by Pauly and 
Swanson (2013) who highlight that true value in SIBs would be achieved when an investor 
can positively impact the outcomes through their skillset and/ or effort. 
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2.3.2 SIBs Characteristics 
 
SIBs provides new sources of funding for social programmes, whilst allowing for genuine 
risk transfer and promoting improved outcomes. 
 
2.3.2.1 New Sources of Funding 
 
Through contractually mandated rigor and measurement of outcome metrics, SIBs provide 
attractive bespoke investment opportunities which appeals to a new generation of socially 
minded impact investors. In an environment where public finances are constrained, funding 
for social programmes is often limited, SIBs thus provides the means for these activities to 
proceed (Mulgan et al., 2011). Social Finance list SIBs objectives as including the crowding 
in of private capital from diverse source, to fund social outcomes (Social Finance Limited, 
2013). 
In times of economic hardship, governments tend to cut back on preventative activities, 
especially where the benefits tend to accrue only over the longer term, or are difficult to 
measure (Liebman & Sellman, 2013). Similarly, development aid and donor flows into 
developing countries are also negatively impacted when financial markets perform poorly 
(Centre for Global Develoment & Social Finance, 2013). Both SIBs and DIBs are seen as 
powerful instruments designed for governments to explore and expand more effective social 
programmes. Furthermore they provide an investment platform to catlyse transformative 
solutions to social problems (Centre for Global Develoment & Social Finance, 2013; Genesis 
Anlaytics, 2014).  
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From a fiscal liquidity view, scarce resources can thus either be retained or redeployed. This 
may be particularly attractive to developing countries needing to fund fiscal deficits. 
2.3.2.2 Risk Transfer 
 
Through a SIB financing arrangement, whilst government is not required to fund the social 
intervention, they are liable to pay the investor both the principal and typically a return. 
Government is however only contractually liable to pay upon specific, measured outcomes 
being met. These outcomes are independently verified. The PBR component of SIBs thus 
appeal to risk-averse governments (Pauly & Swanson, 2013), where bureaucrats operate 
within shrinking budgets and fear of perceived political failure for non-delivery (Wong, 
Ortmann, Motta, & Zhang, 2013).  
Beyond being risk-averse, government funded social programmes typically lack incentives to 
innovate and focus more on input measures as opposed to tracking outputs with a view to 
constantly evolving and improving (Centre for Global Develoment & Social Finance, 2013). 
The benefits that flow from improved social outcomes are often only seen after the current 
political administration is in office (Deprez, 2014). This results in government officials taking 
a more short-termism outlook with respect investing government resources.  
Government thus bears no operational risk, which the Basel Committee defines “The risk of 
loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events” (Bank for International Settlements, 2011,p. 11). This risk transfer has both 
financial and political advantages to the outcome funding government. The operational risk 
of performance failure is borne by the third party service provider, with the financial risk of 
failure borne by the private investor (Genesis Anlaytics, 2014; Mulgan et al., 2011; Wilson, 
2014; Wong et al., 2013). Government thus does not pay for activity undertaken, but through 
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SIBs they can shift risk-free from reactive remedial interventions to more proactive 
preventative solutions (McKinsey & Company, 2012).  
Failure, whilst not generating the social outcome desired, does not reflect poorly on the 
Government, nor will they pay for the attempted intervention. Governments thus only pay for 
measured successful outcomes. 
 
2.3.2.3 Promoting Improved Outcomes 
 
SIBs are in essence a form of outcomes based, or PBR contract type (De Wit, 2013; Wilson, 
2014). The mainstream investment industry has developed various financial metrics to assess 
and measure performance and so in turn allow intermediaries and investors alike to make 
informed decisions. SIBs may provide an instrument or asset type that mainstream investors 
can access for making both financial returns and societal impact. Fundamental to SIBs 
success are that they require the development of credible, reliable and verifiable 
improvements of social outcomes (Scherer & Schenk, 2012). The development of these in 
turn promotes improved social outcomes. 
With payment to investors reliant on measured successful outcomes, much of the focus in 
constructing a SIB is placed on designing and agreeing robust measurable metrics. Success in 
turn is directly linked to these metrics. In so doing, evidence based interventions or activities 
are encouraged from the outset (Mulgan et al., 2011; University of Cape Town et al., 2014). 
In this way SIBs are an extension of managing to outcomes and results based management 
(McKinsey & Company, 2012) with a distinct PPP impact investment focus. 
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Private capital attracted to SIB funded projects encourage greater rigor to performance 
management, increasing the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes (Social Finance 
Limited, 2013). A Genesis Analytics paper entitled “An introduction to Social Impact Bonds” 
supports the views of Social Finance Limited and Sulemankhil & Novak (Sulemankhil & 
Novak, 2012), in that they see external investment encouraging greater rigour, performance 
management and a results orientated focus (Genesis Anlaytics, 2014). 
SIBs are believed to be most effective when investors are in a position to positively impact 
the outcome, through bringing financial expertise and diligence to bear of the project (Pauly 
& Swanson, 2013). One of the channels through which this may be achieved is through the 
development of metrics that measure the desired social outcome and which in turn triggers 
payment back to investors. This links in well given that critical to the future success of SIBs, 
is the demonstration of successful outcomes. Furthermore, to achieve this, and gain a level of 
credibility with taxpayers, the results need to be independently verified, much like public 
companies are required to be independently audited against a set of audit standards. It is also 
critical that the outcome measures correlate strongly with the programmes positive social 
outcomes (Liebman & Sellman, 2013). The outcomes must therefore be open to independent 
scrutiny, ideally against the backdrop of industry accepted metrics and standards. 
The following graph is an illustration of the total global value of launched SIBs, in Canadian 
Dollars (CAD), for the various social issue areas. As of February 2016 the value was CAD 
254million which at a current exchange rate (CAD 1.0000 : ZAR 11.3068), amounts to some 
ZAR 2.872billion. 
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Figure 5: Graph of SIB value by Sector (Social Issue Area). 
Source: Finance for Good (2016) 
 
The existing literature reveals a disparate nomenclature with a number of terms utilized to 
describe similar financing arrangements.  The terms Social Benefit Bonds (SBBs) and pay-
for-success bonds (PFS) are noted  by Bryan and Rafferty (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014). The 
term Development Impact Bond (DIB) is used in cases where a donor or foundation 
supplants, either fully or partially, the government as the outcome funder (Bellinger & 
Fletcher, 2014; Bloomgarden et al., 2014; Centre for Global Develoment & Social Finance, 
2013; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). In instances where the funding finances health care 
interventions aimed at reducing medical costs, the SIB is often referred to as a Health Impact 
Bond (HIB) (Coble, 2014).  
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Impact bonds are generally referred to as a form of pay by results (PbR) arrangement, with 
both SIBs and DIBs featuring in high income and low middle income countries. A notable 
further difference, besides that of government versus external / donor funder, is that SIBs 
may have greater potential for sustained improvements given government participation 
(Gustafsson-Wright & Gardiner, 2016). This is especially true if government is not the 
outcome funder as there is no real public private collaboration (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 
2015). DIBs do however provide a platform to improve the efficiency of aid, the transparency 
of how the funds are spent as well as potentially crowding-in private sector financing where 
more traditional donors are too risk averse (Bellinger & Fletcher, 2014).  
Building on from SIBs and DIBs, Social Yield Notes (SYNs) develop the concept further 
moving further towards a tradeable, liquid equity framework whilst introducing competition, 
through use of multiple service providers (Bellinger & Fletcher, 2014).  
 
2.4 Empirical Literature regarding the effects of SIBs on education 
 
Why are improved education outcomes important in a developing country context such as 
South Africa? More particularly, where might SIBs provide opportunities for government, 
socially responsible investors and private sector service providers to positively impact 
education outcomes? 
South Africa has made significant strides in the reallocation of education spend (from 
historically advantaged to historically disadvantaged) to address apartheid legacy issues. By 
2007, government investment in schooling for African learners had increase by some 76% 
(Hindle, 2007). South African society however continues to reflect huge poverty and 
22 
 
inequality despite more than two decades of democracy. Quality education is seen as one of a 
few key drivers that can assist in overcoming these challenges (National Planning 
Commission, 2012). Recognition of a need to actively continue to address these apartheid 
legacy issues within education, is given by the Western Cape Provincial Government in its 
2014-2019 strategic plan, which identifies improving education outcomes and opportunities 
for youth development as one of its five strategic goals (Western Cape Government, 2014). 
Despite these lofty goals, the South African context reflects stunted child development levels 
of some 25%. Add to this abject poverty, high unemployment, HIV transmission from 
mother-to-child and foetal alcohol syndrome prevalence of some 16% in certain regions, and 
the scope and complexity of the governments challenge becomes more apparent(Patton & De 
Wit, 2015; South African Department of Basic Education, 2015; The World Bank, 2008).  
A 2008 World Bank development report found Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to have both the 
highest incidence of child poverty and education deprivation worldwide. The report goes on 
to confirm numerous earlier research that found that investment in pre-primary / young 
children hugely improves their success in education and consequently economic development 
in the long term. Despite the existence of available research, all indicators pointed to the 
likelihood that SSA would not achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with 
respect to access to education. A key limitation facing governments of the region is limited 
budgets and an inability to re-prioritise education given other priorities such as food security, 
disease and poverty (The World Bank, 2008). Given the global recession and austerity 
measures across even well-endowed territories such as the European Union, funding available 
for education remains constrained. Even existing education spending levels face significant 
threat given the ongoing global financial crises. Consequently governments and policymakers 
facing societal challenges are seeking new and innovative approaches to overcome these 
challenges amid shrinking financial resources (Little & Axford, 2015; The Economist, 2010). 
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Despite the World Banks 2008 report, a more recent report commissioned by the Centre for 
Development & Enterprise, found the South Africa’s education system to be the worst 
performing of all middle-income countries, with the majority of learners were functionally 
illiterate and innumerate in 2013 (Spaull, 2013). Evidence from global research indicates that 
there are both immediate and longer-term benefits to economies. More importantly, as a sub-
section of education, early childhood development interventions is immensely effective at 
levelling the playing-filed and allowing previously disadvantaged and impoverished children 
to excel in the long term (Berry et al., 2013). 
School-ready children that enter the education system are critical to successful education 
outcomes (Karoly, L.A., Kilburn, R., Cannon, 2005). The South African government sees a 
clear linkage between quality education and economic opportunities, specifically to address 
apartheids legacy of structural socio-economic inequalities. With the vast majority of learners 
having been born into a disadvantaged socio-economic setting, primarily along racial divides, 
the country’s Department of Basic Education has signalled clear objectives for improving the 
school-readiness of learners through ECD interventions. The Departments objectives is 
supported by the National Planning Commissions proposals of additional pre-primary 
education resources (Berry et al., 2013). The strategy of utilizing ECD interventions has 
found further implementation support from the Department of Social Development together 
with whom they are collaborating. There also appears to be a growing trend towards working 
innovatively with NGO’s and funders to seek our sustainable business models which deliver 
long-term value and a reduction of inequality (van der Merwe, 2015). In the Western Cape, 
the Provincial government contractually outsources 100% of its ECD services to NGO’s. In 
turn, these NGO’s are also co-funded by private sector investors, yet there is no contractual 
relationship between the provincial government and these private investors (De Wit, 2013). 
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Learners thus need to enter the system equipped with the capacity to  learn (South African 
Department of Basic Education, 2015). The benefits accrue not only to the individual, 
through improved productivity and thus earning potential, but also to the wider society and 
the funders of education, through reduced wastage (UNICEF, 2012). A recent Brookings 
report notes that the greatest challenge to comprehensive ECD interventions is a lack of 
consistent funding. This despite overwhelming evidence that an investment in ECD as a 
preventative intervention, will accrue benefits to individuals and society over time. The 
problem is even greater in developing counties where both quality of existing education and 
the capacity to invest additional resources is limited (Gustafsson-wright & Gardiner, 2016).  
The South African context is interesting in that country’s Constitution, Section 29(1)(a), 
bestows the right to basic education and indeed further education to all its people. Conversely 
to those rights is a government, with limited and under pressure financial resources, which 
must provide that education, or at least make it progressively accessible (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996). 
Improving access to quality education for its citizens is not an objective unique to South 
Africa. Latin America and the Caribbean suffer similarly, and much like South Africa, 
despite having invested heavily in education, outcomes fall short of requirements thus leaving 
large portions of the population below the poverty line with little opportunity to improve 
themselves (Bloomgarden et al., 2014).  
Similarly, the in the US ECD interventions has recently received significant support. In terms 
of direct government funding, some US$ 20 million has recently funded ECD programmes in 
Arizona. Indirectly, US government (or states) have backed more innovative PbR (SIB) 
funding arrangements in Utah and Chicago where ECD programmes are proving impactful 
results to improve education outcomes (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; Stump & Johnson, 
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2016; Temple & Reynolds, 2015; UK Cabinet Office, 2013; van der Merwe, 2015). 
Australian studies have indicated that ECD interventions might yield significant ROI (10%) 
whilst at the same time addressing inequality issues and improvement productivity (van der 
Merwe, 2015). 
Thus, given the financial constraints facing the South African government along with the 
need to redress societal inequalities, the importance of learners having a successful and 
efficient journey through the country’s education system is apparent. The literature explored 
above clearly points to the critical role that ECD interventions play in ensuring these 
objectives are realised through education. They key challenge remains finding innovative 
financing solutions to enable the realisation of ECD’s transformative and economically 
empowering potential.  
2.5 Impact Investing 
 
Impact investing is an approach to investment strategy as opposed to a distinct asset class 
itself. Given that impact is highly context specific, the investment approach is often project 
specific and can be made in both emerging and developed markets. Typically, the investment 
seeks to improve social or environmental issues.  
While the term ‘impact investing’ is relatively new, the activity of investing for impact has 
been in practice for decades. Community development finance and microfinance for example 
are both subsets of impact investing that have their origins in the 1900’s and 1970’s 
respectively (Monitor Institute, 2009).  
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Figure 3 below reflects the growing impact investor segment classified into two broad 
groups. The impact first cohort are primarily motivated to improve societal or environmental 
outcomes, but do however have a minimum return requirement, typically even foregoing a 
portion of return.  The financial first cohort on the other hand are more profit motivated and 
hence seek out commercial returns which deliver concomitant social or environmental 
benefits (Monitor Institute, 2009).  
 
Figure 3: Impact Investor demographics 
Figure 6: Impact Investor demographics 
Source: (Monitor Institute, 2009) 
The literature points to an intentional blend of wider societal returns (be they social or 
environmental) along with financial returns. In 2010, impact investing was aptly described as 
investments intended to create positive impact beyond financial returns (Donohoe, 
Leijonhufvud, & Saltuk, 2010). The description of impact investing was further refined as 
being a profit-motivated investment strategy seeking to intentionally generate measurable 
benefits for society (Grabenwarter & Liechtenstein, 2011).  
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According to Eurosif in 2012, there was no common definition for Impact Investing. They go 
on the describe Impact Investing as being a catch-all descriptor for the funding of social and 
environmental projects, with profits ranging from zero to market-based. They go on to further 
develop the concept to include three key strands:  
- There is an intention to generate social and environmental impacts  
- Whilst at the same time delivering financial returns 
- Highlight the need to be financially sustainable in the long run 
Finally they note Impact Investing to be distinct from philanthropy as the investor retains 
ownerships whilst expecting financial returns to accrue (Eurosif, 2012). 
The Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), defines impact investments as investments 
with the intention to generate measurable social and environmental impact alongside a 
financial return (Global Impact Investment Network, 2014). 
Figure 7: A representation of where Impact Investing resides within investment approaches. 
Figure 4: A representation of where Impact Investing resides within investment approaches. 
Source: (Seegull, 2013) 
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The Monitor Institute in 2009 estimated the potential size of impact investing to grow to 
approximately US$ 500 billion or 1% of total managed assets within 5 – 10 years. Attaining 
this potential will however necessitate overcoming three key challenges. Firstly, there is a 
need to develop more efficient intermediation capacity that would serve to reduce high 
transaction costs and information asymmetry. Secondly, by developing enabling 
infrastructure, through the creation of reliable industry metrics, standards, terminology and 
models, role-players will be empowered to operate in a more structured manner. Thirdly, 
increasing the  absorptive capacity for capital through increasing the available bankable 
opportunities for impact investors (Monitor Institute, 2009). 
 
Figure 8: Monitor Institute’s 2009 Estimate of potential market size. 
Source: (Monitor Institute, 2009) 
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In 2009, the Monitor Institute estimated the potential size of Impact Investing funds could be 
as much as 1% of all Assets Under Management (Monitor Institute, 2009). Five years on, and 
despite some evolution to financing models, a 2014 OECD report, still notes the same 
challenges facing this investment strategy. In addition to a lack of sufficient risk / return 
adjusted investment products, a continued shortage of intermediaries and poorly developed 
market mechanisms, high transaction costs and various market failures are also noted 
(Wilson, 2014). 
 
2.6 Outsourcing, Pay by Results and Public Private Partnerships 
 
As previously noted, outsourcing, PbR and PPPs are different types of arrangements between 
governments and private providers. Outsourcing and PbR are not arrangements for the 
exclusive use of governments alone. They are widely employed by private institutions in the 
normal course of business. Government usage of these mechanisms or arrangements will 
depend on the particular issue at hand. By definition, PPPs include government, though this 
may be at different levels of government, e.g. national, municipal or regional etc. Each 
arrangement is briefly explored below with the view to reflect on how SIBs may be viewed as 
a synthesis of certain of their characteristics. 
 
2.6.1 Outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing is an action whereby an organisation contractually shifts certain aspects of its 
operation to a third party. Typically, outsourcing is used to reduce costs, improve quality of 
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products (Hecker & Kretschmer, 2010; Lu, Ng, & Tao, 2012; Mudambi & Venzin, 2010; 
Relph & Parker, 2014), ensure organisational focus on core activities, increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of value creating processes process (Mudambi & Venzin, 2010) and access 
unique skills or expertise (Hecker & Kretschmer, 2010). Context specific, outsourcing may 
also be employed to develop small business, such as in South Africa, where black economic 
empowerment legislation rewards such endeavours (Luiz, 2002).  
Outsourcing was only formally identified as a business strategy in 1989. The key drivers 
behind this strategy were cost reduction and allowing the organisation to focus on core 
activities. However prior to 1989, organisations certainly utilized external expertise, 
particularly for non-core functions and to meet ancillary business services requirements 
(Relph & Parker, 2014).  It can be argued that an outsourcing strategy is one seeking to 
coordinate and improve an organisations overall value proposition (Mudambi & Venzin, 
2010). For governments, allocation of certain risks, such as operational, completion and 
financial risk, to a specialist outsourced contractually appointed provider, lowers its own risk 
portfolio whilst absolving government from developing the specialist skills itself. 
The key threads, originating from outsourcing, pertinent to SIBs are the contractual shift of 
(service) delivery, with related risk, the expected improvement in efficiency and 
effectiveness, and the anticipated cost reduction. In many respects we are seeing the 
privatisation of risk and reward. 
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2.6.2 Pay by Results 
PbR, also known as Performance based Payments or Pay for Success instruments, have been 
employed by governments in an effort to ensure payment follows successful outcomes, as 
opposed to simply paying for project inputs (OECD, 2013). While well intentioned, the 
reality has been that payment tends to follow certain outputs being delivered instead of upon 
a successful outcome (De Wit, 2013). A distinct disadvantage with PbRs relate to the 
incentives they create. Providers, instead of focusing on achievement of the desired 
outcomes, work towards contractual milestones (McHugh et al., 2013). 
PbRs can be described as a form of contract that organisations (public or private) use to 
engage suppliers and pay them for achieving specific outcomes. They are the most common 
contracts governments enter into. Fundamentally government also retains control of the 
payment decision (Wong et al., 2013) and the selection of the service provider (McHugh et 
al., 2013) in these contracts. The providers typically fund their own business activities and 
consequently bear the risk of success or failure with respect to the service contracted for 
(Ragin & Palandjian, 2013).  
In short PbR contracts are utilized by governments to pay outsourced providers for delivery 
of services relating to measured outcomes, whilst at the same time transferring financial risk 
of failed delivery to the provider (McHugh et al., 2013). 
The key threads, originating from PbR arrangements, pertinent to SIBs are the contractual 
shift of (service) delivery and financial risk together with the aspiration to pay only for 
successful outcomes. Again, this may be viewed as the privatisation of both risk and reward. 
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2.6.3 Public Private Partnerships 
 
In essence, a PPP is an agreement or arrangement between the public sector and a private 
party. The South Africa National Treasury, having constituted a PPP Unit in 1997, legally 
defines a PPP as a “contract between a public sector institution/municipality and a private 
party, in which the private party assumes substantial financial, technical and operational risk 
in the design, financing, building and operation of a project” (National Department of 
Treasury, 1997). 
The World Bank notes that there is no global standard definition for a PPP (The World Bank, 
2014), which points to the likelihood of numerous tailored arrangements. They go on further 
to provide their own definition as being “A long-term contractual arrangement between a 
public entity or authority and a private entity for providing a public asset or service in which 
the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility” (The World Bank, 
2014).  
PPPs have been gaining renewed momentum given their success in the past 15 years (GAVI 
Alliance & The Global Fund, 2013; McKinsey & Company, 2009). The business focus on 
profits through increasing efficiencies and discipline that is brought to bear through PPPs has 
huge upside potential for social change. It is widely believed that PPPs can and should deliver 
even more, and that this would require even more private sector resources, notably private 
sector expertise. These arrangements work best where there is mutual benefit for both the 
public and private sector (McKinsey & Company, 2009). 
In 2009 a World Bank Report cited increased PPP use in the provision of strategic public 
service goods such as education in developing countries, where private sector know how and 
profit seeking efficiencies provide upside benefits of risk transfer, realizing required 
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outcomes at reduced cost. The downside risks noted include loss of government control and 
the exclusion of marginalised learners amongst others. The arguments in favour tend to 
support improving the desired and contracted outcomes. The arguments against tend to focus 
around  non-outcome related concerns such as union fears and loss of control (Patrinos & 
Barrera-osorio, 2009). 
Various countries use different terms or names to describe PPPs. Government-pays 
arrangements fall into the category of Private Finance Initiatives for new assets, with older 
existing assets being referred to as franchises in the UK. The term PPP is strictly for 
government pays contracts in France. Chile uses the term concessions for all forms of PPPs, -
whilst Brazil distinguishes between PPPs which are strictly government-pays and concessions 
where end-users bear the costs (The World Bank, 2014). A key factor driving the need for 
inclusive, innovative and mutually beneficial PPPs is the need for alternate sources of finance 
(GAVI Alliance & The Global Fund, 2013). 
The key threads, originating from PPP contracts, pertinent to SIBs are the bringing together 
of public and private entities, with private expertise, willing and able to shoulder both risk 
and responsibility, being critical in allowing government to realize its aspiration to pay only 
for successful outcomes. Once again, we see both risk and reward being privatised. 
2.7 Challenges facing SIBs  
 
Despite a number of SIBs currently in operation worldwide, all but one has commenced in 
developed economies. High degrees of information asymmetry coupled with the highly 
customized nature of each project and a requirement for exhaustive evidence, translates to 
financing mechanism with high transaction costs (Patton & De Wit, 2015). 
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Jed Emerson is considered the first proponent of blended value within a broader impact-
investing context. His 2000 paper, “Social Return on Investment” (SROI), illuminated 
aspects of value generation originating from non-profits that had previously gone largely 
unnoticed. It furthermore highlighted the link between the social and economic values 
generated. At the same time he points to the use of cost savings or income generation in 
providing a socio-economic value associated with a social intervention (Emerson & Cabaj, 
2000). He further noted that SROI analysis was one of many factors to consider in the 
investment decision. Even as far back as 2000, the challenge in accessing information that 
allows for the analysis of social capital investments were made (Emerson, 2000). 
More than 10 years later, measuring social impact remains a complex, costly and subjective 
task, this despite the introduction of certain reporting standards such as the Impact Reporting 
and Investment Standards (IRIS) (Donohoe et al., 2010). The Young Foundation cite fair 
measurement of the impact as the most technically complex issue facing SIBs, going on to 
indicate the need for the output funder to have confidence in the metric used (Mulgan et al., 
2011). The need to improve measures of social impact is key to increasing the amount of 
investment that might be attracted, through SIBs, to fund improved social outcomes. The 
risk-return decision faced by mainstream investors is currently facilitated by well-established 
financial measures. For SIBs to attract a greater share of mainstream capital, and impact 
investor capital for that matter, social risk and return decisions similarly need to be supported 
by reliable, transparent and verifiable measures (Scherer & Schenk, 2012).  
Finding or creating viable measures for the social outcomes being funded thus remains a key 
challenge for SIBs  (McHugh et al., 2013). The OECD, in supporting this view, highlights the 
need for clear and robust metrics to be established (OECD, 2013). While financial returns are 
quantifiable, measuring social returns continues to prove challenging with little consensus of 
how to value or price this aspect (Wilson, 2014). In supporting Wilson’s assessment, the 
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Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship in their 2014 report note that in measuring social 
impact, no “one-size-fits-all” solution can be applied, as what little quantitative indicators do 
exist tend to ignore the qualitative aspect (Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship, 2014). 
The highly bespoke nature of each SIB, varying terminology and the relative newness of the 
financing mechanism creates high degrees of information asymmetry. This in turn drives high 
transaction costs given the complex legal contracts, financial modelling and requirement for 
data collection, monitoring and evaluation and provision of evidence to substantiate results 
(Nicholls & Tomkinson, 2013; Wilson, 2014). Lengthy planning and development phases 
require dedicated and technically competent staffing commitment from the outcome funder, 
typically governments (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2013).  
In terms of developing / emerging market countries, the challenges are even greater given the 
competencies within government, the restrictive nature of legislation or statutory duties, 
together with the associated complexity of such new forms of funding arrangements (Early 
Intervention Foundation, 2014; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). 
Consequently, few easily accessible social investment SIB products exist in the investment 
market. Closely linked to this is the lack of intermediaries with the experience and skills-set 
to facilitate social investment for impact (City of London Corporation, 2014).  
Unintended consequences remains a concern as SIBs, driving innovative delivery and 
partnership arrangements, risks incentivising undesirable or perverse actions by various 
parties (McHugh et al., 2013; Mulgan et al., 2011; Pauly & Swanson, 2013).  
These may for example result in funding being decanted to activities with more easily 
measured outcomes. Similarly, the SIB asset class may encourage the privatisation of certain 
public / government functions (McHugh et al., 2013).  Similarly, investors may drive 
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agenda’s that steer financing and delivery resources away from high-risk, innovative projects 
that society requires in order to address some of its greatest challenges (Nicholls & 
Tomkinson, 2013; Warner, 2013). 
 
2.8 Overview of Worldwide Educational Social Impact Bonds in operation 
 
The section below will explore the machinations of a number of SIBs / DIBs currently in 
operation, with the view of comparing and contrasting the various aspects in order to provide 
a series of recommendations for the implementation of a SIB within an emerging market 
context such as found in the South African education environment. Currently, no SIBs or 
DIBs exist in the South African market. 
Given the particular focus of this paper on educational interventions within an emerging 
market, only SIBs and DIBs already in existence within the educational sector and/ or an 
emerging market are explored. 
 
2.8.1 Utah High Quality Preschool Program SIB (USA) 
 
This represents the first SIB launched to finance an early childhood education (ECD) 
intervention and has been financed through a partnership between Goldman Sachs Urban 
Investment Group and J.B. Pritzker, with the outcome funder being the State of Utah in the 
USA.  It was launched in August 2013 (Bloomgarden et al., 2014; Gustafsson-Wright & 
Atinc, 2014; UK Cabinet Office, 2013).  
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The Social Issue 
 
The social issue seeking redress is noted as being limited access to ECD for low income 3 
and 4 years olds (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). The United Kingdom’s Centre for Social 
Impact Bonds within the Cabinet Office details the ECD issues as stemming from a the large 
low income population with poor English first language skills. This initial disadvantage 
precipitates poor educational attainment and a reliance on remedial education services at 
significant cost for schools and the state (UK Cabinet Office, 2013). The Wall Street Journal 
cites the issues as being disadvantaged low-income preschool children that are most likely to 
require expensive specialized and costly educational interventions as they progress through 
the schooling system (Barret, 2013). 
 
Stakeholders and Financing 
 
The outcome funder is the State of Utah, with two investors, namely Goldman Sachs Urban 
Investment Group (as the Senior Investor) and J.B. Pritzker (an individual and the 
Subordinate Investor). Goldman Sachs invested US$ 4.60 million with J.B. Pritzker 
contributing US$ 2.40million to provide total funding of US$ 7.00 million. Both funders 
were at risk of losing their entire investment (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015).  
The pay-out to the investors is funded through directly attributable cost savings made by the 
State of Utah (Early Intervention Foundation, 2014; Temple & Reynolds, 2015).  The return 
is capped at 7.26% (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015), with a maximum of six annual 
payments. While the benefits from the intervention are likely to continue to accrue, the State 
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of Utah (along with the School system and Government holistically) will claim all future 
benefits beyond that point (UK Cabinet Office, 2013).  
A number of service providers were drawn into the arrangement, led by the Granite School 
District, who were successful providers lacking capital to scale interventions (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2013) and Park City School District, along with smaller independent providers 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). 
The SIB construction also has an intermediary, United Way of Salt Lake to project manage 
and verify payments, along with technical assistance provided by Voices for Utah Children  
and Granit School District (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). 
 
The Intervention and Outcome Metrics 
 
A special, high impact and targeted programme, had been designed to improve school 
readiness for the cohort of kindergarten children with the desired result being a reduced 
uptake of remedial programmes by the children. This reduced uptake of special education 
programmes will result in cost savings to the outcome funder (Bloomgarden et al., 2014; 
Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; UK Cabinet Office, 2013).  
Linking directly to the cost savings, the outcome metric measured was the number of year of 
remedial / special education that was avoided. The timeframe spanned kindergarten through 
to grade 6 and the payment cohort were selected after having tested two standard deviation 
below the mean on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test (PPVT) (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 
2015). This selection criteria identified the children as being below average and was hence 
seen as a predictor of required future need for costly remedial education (Stump & Johnson, 
2016). 
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Critical Success Factors 
 
The 2015 Brookings Global Economy and Development reports lists two issues as being 
critical to the successful launch of a SIB. Firstly; both the legal counsel and social service 
provider had backgrounds in finance and economics and; secondly there were existing 
relationships between the various parties involved (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). An 
obvious, but no less critical observation, is that the quality of how early education is 
“organised, streamlined, and cost–effective as a system” may indeed determine how 
successful an intervention will be (Kagan & Gomez, 2014, p. 127). To some degree this view 
is supported by Chiodo who notes that existing USA ECD SIBs provides little new 
innovation to delivery services given an established provider, hence the SIB simply provides 
greater access to new funding that can expand service delivery (Chiodo, 2015). 
Strong government support, the need for evidence based interventions and data along with 
role clarity are cited as early lessons in the Economics and Private Sector Topic Guide on 
Non-Traditional Financing for Education (Bellinger & Fletcher, 2014). Similarly, Stump and 
Johnson highlight the positive role that formalised State support, in terms of passed 
legislation allocating funds to support the various SIB role players, thus allowing the project 
to commence (Stump & Johnson, 2016). Lester, in comparing the Rikers Island (N.Y.) and 
Salt Lake County (Utah) SIBs, notes opposing views as to the successes claimed, though 
there are indications that a willingness of stakeholders for continuous improvement is key. 
This especially pertinent as pertains to the way governments and the provision of social 
services evolve through learning by trying new approaches (Lester, 2015). An ability to 
verify successful outcomes within a relatively short time-frame is seen as attractive for 
investors (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2013). 
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2.8.2 Child-Parent Centre Pay for Success Initiative SIB (USA) 
 
This SIB was launched in October 2014 with an objective to improve education outcomes 
through working with kindergarten (4 year old)  children in low-income areas of Chicago, 
Illinois in the USA (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). It was the fifth SIB in the USA (Temple 
& Reynolds, 2015). Goldman Sachs Social Impact Fund, along with Northern Trust 
Corporation were the senior investors along with J.B and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation 
(City of Chicago, 2014).  
 
The Social Issue 
 
As with the Utah High Quality Preschool SIB, the social issue seeking redress was the limited 
access to early childhood education for low income children (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). 
The City of Chicago highlighted the need to enable low-income families to access pre-
kindergarten education, which in turn links a strong educational foundation to ongoing 
educational success. Furthermore, empowering parents through upskilling, enables them to 
become active partners in their children’s continuing education. (City of Chicago, 2014). 
Temple and Reynolds note the potential of such special early childhood education 
interventions delivering sufficient savings to cover the cost of preschool. Furthermore, Child-
Parent-Centre programmes had already been in existence for some years already and this 
innovative financing initiative represented an opportunity to roll-out a more comprehensive 
programme (Temple & Reynolds, 2015).  
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Stakeholders and Financing 
 
The outcome funder in this instance was the City of Chicago Office of the Major along with 
Chicago Public Schools. Interestingly each of the two outcome funders pay for distinctly 
separate outcomes, a unique aspect of this particular SIB construction (Gustafsson-wright & 
Gardiner, 2016) 
 
Two senior investors participated in the SIB namely; Goldman Sachs Social Impact Fund and 
Northern Trust Corporation (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). Goldman Sachs provided US$ 
7.40 million, with the Northern Trust Corporation providing US$ 5.40 million. A total thus of 
US$ 12.8 million in senior investment financing was provided (Stump & Johnson, 2016).  
In terms of subordinate loan financing, J.B and M.K. Pritzker Family Foundation provided 
some US$ 4.00 million. Once again the full face value of both senior and subordinate 
investors invested capital was at risk should the funded interventions not realise the required 
improvement in academic results (Chiodo, 2015; City of Chicago, 2014; Gustafsson-Wright 
et al., 2015; Temple & Reynolds, 2015). 
The returns paid to investors were funded through cost savings that would be achieved as a 
result of reduced take up of special education programmes. The return is capped at 6.00% per 
annum across the various funders over  a 4 year period (Chiodo, 2015; Gustafsson-Wright et 
al., 2015). Child-Parent-Centre programme, having been in existence for some time, had an 
established record for successful outcomes in both the long and short term, with longitudinal 
analyses indicating considerable savings to government (Temple & Reynolds, 2015). We thus 
might expect the benefits to accrue into the future to the outcome funders and society at large.  
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Chicago Public Schools were the service provider (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015) and 
comprised six public schools (Stump & Johnson, 2016). As with the Utah SIB, the service 
provider already had a track record and the SIB allowed the Child Parent Centre initiative in 
Chicago to be further scaled (Temple & Reynolds, 2015).  
The intermediary in Chicago was the Illinois Facilities Fund with the Metropolitan Family 
Foundation and the Harvard Kennedy SIB Lab providing technical assistance (Gustafsson-
Wright et al., 2015). The Harvard Kennedy School SIB team provided analytical monitoring 
and evaluation services with respect to procurement and data analysis (Stump & Johnson, 
2016). Furthermore, the Harvard Kennedy School SIB team worked with the City of Chicago 
to create the pay for success contract with reference to an evidence based programme 
(Temple & Reynolds, 2015). Their services were provided at no charge as they sought to 
better understand the SIB model, or tool, could be employed for the benefit of target 
populations through better utilisation of existing state or government data (Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2013). 
 
The Intervention and Outcome Metrics 
 
The intervention involved an expansion, or a further scaling, of Child Parent Centre 
enrolments on bespoke pre-kindergarten programmes (Temple & Reynolds, 2015). The half-
day programmes for pre-kindergarten children was coupled with parent engagement 
programmes and had a clear objective of improving educational outcomes (Gustafsson-wright 
& Gardiner, 2016). The SIB financing allowed for impactful revision to the existing Child 
Parent Centre programme offering that could be delivered with in specific guidelines and 
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requirements. Consequently it has been hailed as proven and preventative model for school 
reform that will improve school readiness of participants (Temple & Reynolds, 2015).  
The intervention programme being funded will see a reduced uptake in remedial and special 
education services from kindergarten through to the 12th grade. The increased readiness of the 
pre-schoolers will be assessed utilizing standard assessment tools with a further required 
improvement assessed against increased 3rd grade reading scores. Improvements in these 
metrics in turn obviates the requirement for accessing costly remedial education services, this 
results in reduced costs which outcome funders would be required to pay in future years 
(Gustafsson-Wright & Gardiner, 2016; Stump & Johnson, 2016; Temple & Reynolds, 2015). 
 
Critical Success Factors 
 
Child parent centres had been in operation since the 1960’s in Chicago and were thus well 
placed to deliver the requisite interventions given their pre-existing track record of 
achievement (Gustafsson-wright & Gardiner, 2016). The involvement of the public 
commissioner and a high degree of freedom and scope to reconfigure how delivery 
architecture seen as positives. Chido goes on however to highlight that there are no delivery 
innovations and the SIB construction merely ensure new sources of funding are available to 
expand and innovate existing service delivery (Chiodo, 2015). 
Whilst short-term savings fund the payments to investors, additional measures more closely 
tied to longer-term positive externalities were also included, thus seeking to ensure long-term 
savings to the outcome funders and society as a whole. Furthermore, demonstrable cost 
savings from the reduction in the need to provide remedial education, ensured critical 
political buy-in  enable project success (Gustafsson-wright & Gardiner, 2016). 
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Similar to the Utah ECD SIB, the support of government, through the US Department of 
Education providing a grant from its Investing in Innovation Fund, was an important signal 
that allowed the SIB project to develop (Stump & Johnson, 2016). 
 
2.8.3 Junior Code Academy SIB (Portugal) 
 
This represents Portugal’s first ECD SIB, and it is financed by the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation, with the outcome funder being the Municipality of Lisbon. Launched in January 
2015, the contract period is only 20 months and the target population is small in comparison 
to the Utah (up to 3,500 low income 3 and 4 year-olds) and Chicago (2,600 low income 4 
year-olds) SIBs, at only 65 3rd and 4th grade students (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). 
 
The Social Issue 
 
The Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce cites figures of some 17.4% of young people 
dropping out of school with a concomitant youth unemployment of 34.5% (Portuguese Social 
Investment Taskforce, 2015). The social issue seeking redress in this instance is primary 
school grade repetition and drop-out rates (Noya & Galitopoulou, 2015). The intervention is 
very much a pilot that is being implemented in three public schools in Lisbon (Giguere, 
Bonaglia, & Noya, 2015).  
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Stakeholders and Financing 
 
The outcome funder is the Municipality of Lisbon in Portugal, who was ultimately 
responsible for the primary education system. Only one primary investor participated, the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, a private public utility foundation in Portugal. Financing 
amounting to US$ 0.114 million was provided. The entire amount was provided at risk 
(Giguere et al., 2015; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; Portuguese Social Investment 
Taskforce, 2015). The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation provided a further US$ 0.034 million 
in the form of a grant, this was utilized to acquire robots and equipment (Gustafsson-Wright 
et al., 2015). To date, this is the smallest SIB, however this pilot, if successful may be scaled 
to a further 90 school throughout Lisbon by the year 2017 (Vennema, 2016). 
The service provider in this instance was the Code Academy, a for profit business 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). Assistance was provided in the form pro-bono services 
from the Social Investment Lab and the Nova School of Business and Economics. These 
assisted the service provider in structuring the SIB and developing the financial model along 
with identifying the various metrics and evaluation methods (Noya & Galitopoulou, 2015). 
The technical support was provided by the University of Aveiro in Portugal (Gustafsson-
Wright et al., 2015). 
 
The IRR (Internal Rate of Return) for the investment was set at 2.0% with only two payments 
due from the outcome funder. The first was due after 12 months and upon achieving 
improvements in assessed logical thinking and problem solving. The second payment was 
due at the end of 20 months and this was linked to improvements in performance in the 
national exams (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015).  
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Interestingly, unlike in the two American ECD SIBs discussed earlier, there is no indication 
from available literature that links any anticipated savings to the outcome funder to how the 
outcome funder will finance the payments to the investor.  
 
The Intervention and Outcome Metrics 
 
The intervention in this instance involved utilizing computer programming as a learning  
intervention (Noya & Galitopoulou, 2015). As with the Utah and Chicago SIBs, a special 
programme was created. A salient difference in this instance however was that it was not an 
expansion or scaling of an existing intervention (Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015). The 30 
week programme was however integrated and aligned with into the school curriculum 
seeking to improve performance and problem solving abilities (Noya & Galitopoulou, 2015; 
Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce, 2015). 
This measure of efficacy of this SIB has been based on objective and measurable indicators 
with a direct causal link back to the training intervention provided. Furthermore, these are 
validated against progress displayed in the compulsory Portuguese national examinations for 
mathematics and Portuguese language proficiency. The Nova School of Business and 
Economics (the intermediary), using randomized control trials, performs the evaluation 
(Vennema, 2016). A 10% improvement was set as the target to indicate a successful outcome 
(Boggild & Bronson, 2015). 
 
Critical Success Factors 
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The use of randomized control trails significantly increases the validity of the outcomes 
evaluated. It is however acknowledged that this is likely only possible given the size and 
scope of the this small SIB (Vennema, 2016). Considerable effort in monitoring and 
evaluation during the pilot programme, improves the likelihood of further funding for future 
programmes and scaling, whilst providing better evidence of success (Giguere et al., 2015).  
 
Furthermore, given the intervention is computer based, daily performance assessments are 
possible. This in turn allows for rapid optimization interventions thus enabling better 
monitoring and evaluation for the programmes (Portuguese Social Investment Taskforce, 
2015). 
 
2.8.4 Educate Girls Development DIB (India) 
 
Launched in mid-2015, this represents the world’s first DIB, in India, seeking to improve 
education outcomes. A single investor, UBS Optimus Foundation, has financed the 
interventions, with the outcome funder in this instance the Children’s Investment Fund 
Foundation (CIFF) (Instiglio, 2015; Thorpe, 2015). Given the nature of DIBs, we thus see a 
foundation as the outcome funder as opposed to the government or government agency / 
municipality as seen in the previous three examples discussed in the preceding sections. A 
Forbes article cites this DIB as an experiment that has the potential to marry impact 
conscious investors with a more results focussed development community (Thorpe, 2015). 
 
The Social Issue 
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Globally India has the largest illiterate population despite significant investments made in 
education. The nature of the prevailing culture further discriminates against girls who are 
most frequently denied regular access to education, be that through being required to remain 
home to care for younger siblings or poor hygiene and safety conditions. Consequently, 
illiteracy rates in girls exceeded that of boys, with some 44% of girls classified as literate 
whereas some 77% of boys are (Instiglio, 2015). This education gender gap is particularly 
notable in rural Rajasthan given it has the highest number of districts recording the worst 
gender indicators in India, with a staggering 15% of girls being married before they are 10 
years old amongst others (Dastoor, 2015).  
 
Stakeholders and Financing 
 
The outcome funder is the UK based Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), with 
UBS Optimus Foundation as the only investor. An amount of US$ 267,000 is invested over 
the three year contract period and the full amount is provided on risk. The funds are to be 
disbursed in two equal tranches, the first upon conclusion of the contractual aspects in June 
2015 and the second a year later in June 2016 (Instiglio, 2015). 
Unlike the two American ECD SIBs discussed earlier, there are no attributable savings from 
the funded intervention, which can fund the repayments to the investor. It is thus more akin to 
the Portuguese pilot SIB with the distinction being that in this instance the exogenous savings 
and benefits accrue to the Indian government and society, whereas in the Portuguese SIB, the 
outcome funder representing government (Municipality of Lisbon) would itself accrue the 
exogenous benefits. 
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Instead, the outcome payments are linked to the historical programme delivery costs incurred 
by the service provider, Educate Girls, who has been operating, with a solid track record in 
delivering impact, for almost a decade (Dastoor, 2015; Instiglio, 2015).  The project manager, 
providing technical assistance to ensure appropriate design and measurement metrics are in 
place, is Instiglio, a Columbian not for profit organisation. Evaluation services are provided 
by IDinsight, a US impact investment multinational firm who verify outcomes and Dalberg 
Global Development Advisors (a multinational consulting firm), who will evaluate the 
process (Instiglio, 2015). 
 
The Intervention and Outcome Metrics 
 
The intervention in this instance seeks to improve both literacy and numeracy amongst 
Rajasthan girls, whilst at the same time aims to ensure disadvantaged girls firstly get into 
school (i.e. enrolment), and secondly remain there (Thorpe, 2015). Educate Girls, a non-
profit, collaborates with administrators and teachers in government primary school, to ensure 
a better quality of education is provided for girls (Dastoor, 2015). 
The interventions required significant non-educational project management to identify out of 
school girls and educate their parents and communities about the benefits of attending school. 
It also requires addressing infrastructure concerns such as lack of female toilets and unsecure 
school premises. This is coupled with a child-centric curriculum delivered primarily by 
young female volunteers from the communities (Instiglio, 2015).  
Broadly speaking, two key outcome metrics need to be achieved to be considered successful. 
Firstly, enrolment targets, attributable to Educate Girls efforts must be met. The enrolments 
are independently verified using sampling techniques and seeks to ensure reward continued 
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enrolment through to the contractual end. Secondly, the student’s academic performance in a 
widely used literacy and numeracy assessment, needs to reflect an improvement against a 
control group’s performance over the contract period (Instiglio, 2015).  
 
 
Critical Success Factors 
 
Aligned with the two American ECD SIBs, we once again have a service provider, in the 
form of Educate Girls, with a proven track-record for delivering successful interventions 
(Instiglio, 2015; Thorpe, 2015). Furthermore, they work with existing government funded 
schools to reinforce education for girls through reducing drop-out rates and facilitating the 
return of girls that had previously dropped out (Dastoor, 2015). A critical innovation, by 
Educate Girls, saw technology utilized in real time to improve performance management and 
ensure ongoing refinements to improve performance (Gustafsson-wright & Gardiner, 2016). 
A further benefit seeking recognition from this DIB is that of ‘proof of concept’ (akin to a 
pilot) in showing other donors / investors that such an innovative financing structure might be 
employed to delivery both financial returns and positive societal impact. This may in turn 
lead to further investment in such programmes (Instiglio, 2015; Thorpe, 2015).  
While the size of the target group in this instance is enormous at approximately 18,000 girls, 
the investment amount provided is relatively small compared to the two US ECD SIBS 
previously discussed. The self-stated proof of concept objective makes this DIB more akin to 
the Portuguese SIB in that it is laying the groundwork for future scaling of interventions.  
 
  
51 
 
2.9 Summary data of all active SIBs 
 
The summary data contained in appendix 1 (Table 5: Summary data of active SIBs (as at 
February 2016)), provides the potential for insight into the typical SIB contract duration 
(Finance for the Good, 2016).  
The data is summarized below: 
 
Table 1: Active SIBs contract duration variation and standard deviation 
 
The percentage standard deviation, at 45.4% from the mean (average), reflects a very high 
degree of volatility. Essentially this indicates that contract duration is not clustered 
particularly closely around an average set timeframe. This is not surprising given the 
relatively small sample size, the wide disparity of interventions funded and the number of 
different stakeholders involved. Furthermore we see that a longest duration of 120 months, 
with the shortest being only 12 months. 
 
 
 
 
Sum of Months 2758.8
Count (n) 57
Average (mean) 48.4
High (months) 120.0
Low (months) 12.0
Variance 482.2
Standard Deviation 22.0
% Standard Deviation 
from Mean
45.4%
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2.10 Conclusion of Literature Review 
 
The literature review has explored SIBs in order to provide a greater understanding of origins 
and the factors influencing their successful adoption in a developing market context. The 
need for an innovative financing arrangement to improve education outcomes at the ECD 
level was examined, with particular focus on the South African context. The evolutionary 
trajectories of both PPPs and Impact Investing revealed that SIBs are a logical next step for 
government to transfer risk and reward to the private sector whilst ensuring improved social 
outcomes are achieved. Both the positive characteristics and the challenges facing SIBs were 
highlighted to provide a balanced understanding of the potential and limitations these 
innovative financing mechanisms possess. The existing active ECD SIBs / DIBs were then 
compared and contrasted to how stakeholder in the South African ECD context might 
develop and implement a successful SIB. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter looks into the learnings garnered from Chapter 2 by comparing and contrasting 
the various aspects of the active ECD SIBs. This thesis set out to provide lessons for the 
implementation of SIBs to improve ECD outcomes in an emerging market context. An 
extensive review was conducted which explored the origins and the purpose of SIBs. It also 
reviewed the need for improving education outcomes in South Africa. The review also 
examined the broader impact investing arena and how SIBs may be view as the next 
evolution of public-private partnership mechanisms. The conclusion is discussed further 
below. 
3.2 Summary of active SIB’s 
 
The table below summarises certain aspects of the SIBs / DIBs that are already active and 
which focus on improving education outcomes. The information is distilled from the 
literature review above. 
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Table 2: Summary of active ECD SIB / DIB information 
Source: (Dastoor, 2015; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015; Instiglio, 2015; Thorpe, 2015) 
Given that only four such SIBs / DIBs are currently active, it would be inappropriate to 
attempt any form of regression analysis or detailed quantitative analysis. There are however a 
few interesting points to highlight. These are highlighted below: 
a) There is a huge disparity in the quantum of funding provided. The two US SIBs are both 
multi-million Dollar investment projects. The Portuguese and Indian interventions combined 
are less than half a million Dollars.  
b) There is a huge disparity in the size of the target population. The largest, the Indian DIB, 
targets 18,000 learners, whereas the smallest, the Portuguese SIB, targets only 65. The 
SIB / DIB NAME
Utah High 
Quality 
Preschool 
Program
Chicago Child 
– Parent Pay 
for Success 
Initiative
Junior Code 
Academy
Educate Girls 
DIB
COUNTRY STATUS Developed Developed Developed Developing
TARGET POPULATION 
(NUMBER) 3,500 2,600 65 18,000
CONTRACT DURATION 
(MONTHS) 60 48 20 48
OUTCOME FUNDERS 
(NUMBER) 1 2 1 1
INVESTORS (NUMBER) 2 3 1 1
SERVICE PROVIDERS 
(NUMBER) 6 1 1 1
MAXIMUM LOSS EXPOSURE 
(%) 100% 100% 100% 100%
MAXIMUM RETURN (%) 7.26% 6.00% 2.00% 15.00%
FUNDING (AMOUNT IN US$) 7,000,000 16,900,000 148,000 267,000
FUNDING PER PERSON (US$) 2,000 6,500 2,277 15
FUNDING PER PERSON PER 
MONTH (US$) 33 135 114 0.3
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Portuguese SIB, is clearly identified as a pilot programme, which may explain the low 
quantum of investment Dollars required. However, the opposite does not hold true of the 
Indian DIB, which has the largest target population, yet only attracts a small fraction of 
investment dollars compared to the US SIBs.  
c) At its launch on October 2014, the Chicago SIB was the largest ever by investment value 
at US$ 16.9 million. The Utah SIB, launched in the previous year, attracted only US$ 7 
million, 60% less than the Chicago SIB. The other two have attracted substantially less 
funding.  (Refer to Table 2 below). 
 
Table 3: Active ECD SIB / DIB funding proportions. 
Source: Author derived from Table 1 
d) Despite the relatively small (US$ 148,000) quantum of total investment dollars in the 
Portuguese pilot SIB, the per dollar spend per learner of US$ 2,277, is the second largest of 
the four active SIBs reviewed.  It also represents the second largest per month spend per 
learner of the active SIBs. While the Utah SIB, which attracted significant gross funding, 
provides only US$ 2,000 per learner. This translates to US$ 33 per learner per month. The 
Chicago SIB, not only has the largest quantum of investment Dollars, but also the largest 
spend per learner and the largest per learner spend per month. (Refer to table 3 below). 
SIB / DIB NAME
Chicago Child 
– Parent Pay 
for Success 
Initiative
Utah High 
Quality 
Preschool 
Program
Educate Girls 
DIB
Junior Code 
Academy
FUNDING (AMOUNT IN US$) 16,900,000 7,000,000 267,000 148,000
TOTAL INVESTMENT (US$)
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 69.5% 28.8% 1.1% 0.6%
24,315,000
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Table 4: Funding Statistics of active ECD SIBs / DIBs. 
Source: Author derived from Table 1 
e) The target numbers reflect a large outlier in the India Educate Girls DIB, which seeks to 
deliver to some 18,000 children, of which 9,000 will be girls. The invested Dollars per 
learner, and per month spend are significantly smaller than the other SIBs and may well 
reflect volume efficiency gains, a relatively low cost of scaling the existing interventions 
within a rural setting of a developing economy or other factors not available from available 
literature.  
f) Besides the Chicago SIB, with two outcome funders, each of the other SIB’s has only one 
outcome funder. This is likely to reduce the contractual complexity.  
g) The number of investors is also relatively small, with the Chicago SIB having the highest 
number with three, followed by Utah’s SIB with two and the Portuguese and Indian 
interventions each with one. The US SIBs share a common investor pool, being Goldman 
Sachs and JB Pritzker. Goldman Sachs in particular has been active in the impact investment 
arena and has funded two other SIBs in the US. The first, a 2012 Rikers Island prison 
recidivism SIB in New York, and secondly a 2014 Massachusetts prison recidivism SIB 
(Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015),  pointing to having a level of expertise and competence 
with this new form of innovative financing.  
 
SIB / DIB NAME
Chicago Child 
– Parent Pay 
for Success 
Initiative
Junior Code 
Academy
Utah High 
Quality 
Preschool 
Program
Educate Girls 
DIB
FUNDING PER PERSON (US$) 6,500 2,277 2,000 15
FUNDING PER PERSON PER 
MONTH (US$) 135 114 33 0.3
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h) Both the Chicago SIB and the Portuguese SIB arrangements featured the involvement of 
tertiary institution expertise. In the case of the Chicago SIB, the Harvard Kennedy Business 
School Social Impact Bond Lab provided technical supported. In the case of the Portuguese 
SIB, Nova School of Business provided evaluation and intermediary service. In both 
instances, the services and expertise was provided free of charge. 
Having compared and contrasted the various ECD SIBs in operations, the following section 
provides a conclusion as to their applicability in an emerging market context such as South 
Africa. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Based on the content review in the previous sections, this section below provides 
recommendations for the implementation of SIBs to improve ECD outcomes in an emerging 
market context. 
 
4.2. Recommendations 
 
The overarching purpose of this investigation is to provide lessons that will help the 
successful adoption and implementation of an ECD SIB (or DIB) in South Africa. This 
objective has been accomplished through an examination of the challenges facing South 
African education and exploring the evolution of both impact investing and public private 
partnerships. Furthermore, an examination of existing ECD SIBs and DIBs already in 
existence has provided a deeper understanding of the landscape. These in turn have informed 
the recommendations provided below. 
For SIBs and DIBs to become practical and scalable, especially in a developing economy 
such as South Africa, which is also facing harsh financial realities, the parties will need to 
overcome the hurdles of high transaction costs, information asymmetry and complexity.  
The primary recommendation is that the contract duration should be short, ideally within 5 
years. In reviewing the contract duration for all active SIBs, we see that the average (mean) 
duration is 48.4 months (refer to Table 1: Active SIBs contract duration variation and 
standard deviation). However as can be seen from Table 2: Summary of active ECD SIB / 
59 
 
DIB information, the longest active ECD SIB is 60 months (5 years), with the shortest being 
20 months. The active ECD SIB average duration is 44 months. 
The recommendation implies that the benefits or improved social outcomes must also be 
evident within this timeframe. Furthermore, this implies repayment to investors in the 
medium to short term. Consequently monitoring, evaluation and gathering of evidence needs 
to be focussed to ensure project management and early detection of any potential variances. 
Given the nascent nature of this form of financing arrangement, it is also likely that 
stakeholder preference would be for short-term contractual commitments. 
A second recommendation would be that due cognisance ought to be given on how to 
ameliorate high initial costs across a number of these financing mechanisms over time. In 
terms of a SIB, with government as the outcome funder, this may take the form of 
government piloting multiple SIBs within one of its departments. In this manner, a level of 
expertise in managing the complexities can be cultivated. At the same time, a requirement for 
gathering data, documenting processes and learnings could increase the knowledge base 
within government for use in other areas. This would firstly reduce multiple government 
agencies from each undergoing a steep learning curve and secondly allow government to 
develop policy and practice notes for future implementation and scaling across other 
agencies.  
In terms of a DIB, with donors as outcome funders, this may take the form of donor agencies 
pooling resources to create a DIB Outcomes Fund as suggested by the Centre for Global 
Development and Social Finance (Centre for Global Develoment & Social Finance, 2013).  
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Complimented with greater transparency, process documentation and information sharing 
amongst government agencies, donors, recipients and service providers, these might over 
time reduce transaction costs and lead to the development of more robust and replicable 
models. 
A third recommendation is that investor capital be fully exposed to risk should defined social 
outcomes not be met. As can be seen in Table 2: Summary of active ECD SIB / DIB 
information above, in each of the active SIBs / DIBs investor or donor funding is provided at 
100% exposure to loss should the interventions fail to achieve the stated and measured 
outcomes. This is likely to be a key factor in persuading risk averse government agencies to 
participate. 
A fourth recommendation is that the number of outcome funders should be kept to an 
absolute minimum. As can seen in Table 2: Summary of active ECD SIB / DIB information, 
all but one (with two outcome funders) of the active SIBs / DIBs have only one outcome 
funder. Closely linked to recommendation one above, government should consider 
concentrating efforts within one of its departments. 
The final recommendation is that independent expertise, in the form of tertiary institution 
involvement, should be encouraged. Drawing on the learnings from the literature review, two 
of the four active ECD SIBs include the participation of specialist university departments / 
units. The involvement of higher education specialised units not only brings independent 
expertise to the process, but also provides an outlet for the dissemination of peer reviewed 
research findings. This may in turn reduce information asymmetry and grow the body of 
knowledge and best practice with respect to implementation of SIBs. 
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The following section suggests areas of future research that may further advance the viable 
use of SIBs in an emerging market context to improve ECD outcomes and deliver a positive 
social impact for society. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
Improving education outcomes in South Africa is critical for both the economy and the social 
and economic upliftment for the majority of its citizens. As a distinct subset of education, 
ECD interventions have been identified by the South African Department of Basic Education, 
as a critical component of implementing its strategy to improve the school-readiness of 
learners. Similarly, the Western Cape Government Department has identified improving 
education outcomes for its youth as one of its five key strategic objectives. At the same time, 
the South African economy, in the face of global financial uncertainty, continues to perform 
well below expectation, with growth struggling to breach the 1% level. Funding for the South 
African government is therefore restricted, limiting funding even for existing government 
programmes. 
 
Consequently, both national and provincial government are attuned to improving education 
outcomes whilst facing significant financial constraints. SIBs present an innovative financing 
solution through which both national and provincial governments can achieve their 
objectives, without exposure to financial and performance risk should they elect to proceed 
with a business as usual approach. The implementation of a SIB in this context is likely to 
receive widespread support as government / province seek to improve this aspect of social 
outcomes. 
62 
 
Having concluded that SIBs may be well received as an innovative finance mechanism to 
improve ECD outcomes in an emerging market, the following Chapter provides 
recommendations to be considered for their implementation. 
 
4.4. Future Research 
 
This section outlines areas of future study that may advance the improved ECD outcomes in 
emerging markets through the use of innovative financing mechanisms such as SIBs. 
There have been a number of exciting developments in the impact investment arena in South 
Africa recently. More specifically for SIBs, as an innovative financing mechanism, is the 
announcement that the Western Cape Government has set aside R 25 million (US $ 1.62 
million) for the development of three SIBS. This will represent the first SIB to be launched in 
a Lower Middle Income Country (LMIC) / developing market country. The three SIBs will 
focus on improving ECD and maternal outcomes in the Western Cape (Gardiner & 
Gustafsson-Wright, 2016).  
Given this development, further research into the suitability of SIBs in improving social 
outcomes would certainly enrich the current dialogue. Possible future research could be 
conducted in the following areas: 
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1. The role of Higher Education Institutions 
A qualitative study that seeks to understand the role of Higher Education, as thought- leaders, 
should play in developing and facilitating SIBs. Given that two of the four ECD SIBs in 
production, as well as the development of the Western Cape SIBs, featured inputs from 
specialised units within tertiary institutions, it would appear that Higher Education may have 
a critical role to play. 
2. Legal Impediments to SIBs in South Africa 
A study that investigates the legal framework (e.g. Public Finance Management Act) under 
which government contracts with service providers and financiers would highlight the 
potential legal or regulatory impediments facing SIBs. 
3. Measuring Impact – Cost Savings 
A quantitative investigation into achievable cost savings to government, would reduce 
information asymmetry and potentially facilitate a greater willingness by investors and 
government to enter into SIB arrangements. 
4. Measuring Impact – Social Impact 
An investigation and development of impact assessment models appropriate to a developing 
economy setting may provide a better set of monitoring and evaluating metrics to assess 
impact. 
5. Higher Education Institutions as Outcome Funders 
As noted earlier in this study, access to education in South Arica is widespread. The problem 
is the quality of education in the vast majority of schools is poor. Primarily the majority of 
black school leavers are inadequately prepared for university studies. Incidence of dropouts, 
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repeat years or need to enrol on extended degree programmes are high. This in turn drives up 
operating costs for Universities. Universities are also likely to have robust data as to the 
additional costs incurred. Consequently, a quantitative investigation into potential cost 
savings for universities, may justify their consideration of taking on a role as outcome 
funders in a SIB financing construction to improve the quality of 1st year intake cohorts. 
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Table 5: Summary data of active SIBs 
Source: (Finance for the Good, 2016; Gustafsson-Wright et al., 2015) 
Number
Social Impact Bond 
Name Country Social Issue Area Year
Length 
(Months)
25.00 Essex Family Therapy United 
Kingdom
Foster Care 
Avoidance
2012 96
26.00 It's All About Me United 
Kingdom
Foster Care 
Avoidance
2013 120
27.00 Outcomes for 
Children
United 
Kingdom
Foster Care 
Avoidance
2014 48
28.00
Manchester City 
Council Vulnerable 
Children
United 
Kingdom
Foster Care 
Avoidance 2014 60
29.00 Ambition East 
Midlands
United 
Kingdom
Youth Homelessness 2014 36
30.00 Rewriting Futures United 
Kingdom
Youth Homelessness 2014 36
31.00 Aspire Gloucester
United 
Kingdom Youth Homelessness 2014 36
32.00 Local Solutions
United 
Kingdom Youth Homelessness 2014 36
33.00 Home Group
United 
Kingdom Youth Homelessness 2014 36
34.00 Fusion Housing
United 
Kingdom Youth Homelessness 2014 36
35.00 Your Chance United 
Kingdom
Youth Homelessness 2014 36
36.00 Unlocking Potential United 
Kingdom
Youth Employment 
and Education
2015 36
37.00 Prevista United 
Kingdom
Youth Employment 
and Education
2015 36
38.00 Futureshapers 
Sheffield Ltd.
United 
Kingdom
Youth Employment 
and Education
2015 36
39.00 Teens and Toddlers 
Youth Engagement 
United 
Kingdom
Youth Employment 
and Education
2015 36
40.00 Ways to Wellness Ltd United 
Kingdom
Healthcare 2015 84
41.00 NYC ABLE Project 
(Rikers)
United 
States
Youth Employment 
and Education
2012 48
42.00 Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
United 
States
Early Childhood 
Development
2013 60
43.00 New York State SIB United 
States
Recidivism 2013 66
44.00 Juvenile Justice Pay 
For Success Initiative
United 
States
Recidivism 2014 84
45.00
Chronic Individual 
Homelessness Pay for 
Success Initiative
United 
States Homelessness 2014 72
46.00 Partnering for Family 
Success
United 
States
Homelessness 2014 60
47.00 Chicago Public 
Schools
United 
States
Early Childhood 
Development
2014 48
48.00 Reconnections Ltd. United 
Kingdom
Healthcare 2015 0
49.00 Project Welcome 
Home
United 
States
Homelessness 2014 72
50.00 Richmond United 
States
Other 2015 60
51.00 Alumah Association Israel Youth Employment 
and Education
2015 96
52.00 Epiqus Finland Healthcare 2015 36
53.00 Juvat Austria Employment 2015 36
54.00 Fokus Bern Switzerland Employment 2015 60
55.00 Coalition for 
Supportive Housing
United 
States
Homelessness 2016 60
56.00 Nurse Family 
Partnership
United 
States
Healthcare 2016 72
57.00 Connecticut Family 
Stability Project
United 
States
Foster Care 
Avoidance
2016 54
